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Abstract
Android’s filesystem access control provides a foundation
for Android system integrity. Android utilizes a combina-
tion of mandatory (e.g., SEAndroid) and discretionary (e.g.,
UNIX permissions) access control, both to protect the An-
droid platform from Android/OEM services and to protect An-
droid/OEM services from third-party apps. However, OEMs
often create vulnerabilities when they introduce market-
differentiating features because they err when re-configuring
this complex combination of Android policies. In this paper,
we propose the PolyScope tool to triage the combination of
Android filesystem access control policies to vet releases for
vulnerabilities. The PolyScope approach leverages two main
insights: (1) adversaries may exploit the coarse granularity of
mandatory policies and the flexibility of discretionary policies
to increase the permissions available to launch attacks, which
we call permission expansion, and (2) system configurations
may limit the ways adversaries may use their permissions to
launch attacks, motivating computation of attack operations.
We apply PolyScope to three Google and five OEM Android
releases to compute the attack operations accurately to vet
these releases for vulnerabilities, finding that permission ex-
pansion increases the permissions available to launch attacks,
sometimes by more than 10X, but a significant fraction of
these permissions (about 15-20%) are not convertible into
attack operations. From PolyScope’s results, we describe two
previously unknown vulnerabilities and show how PolyScope
helps OEMs triage the complex combination of access control
policies down to attack operations worthy of testing.
1 Introduction
Android has become the most dominant mobile OS platform
worldwide, deployed by a large number of vendors across a
wide variety of form factors, including phones, tablets, and
wearables [43]. With Android’s increased integration into
people’s daily lives, Android needs to provide sufficient and
∗Giuseppe Petracca’s work on this paper was performed when he was a
graduate student at Penn State.
appropriate assurances of platform integrity. Additionally,
vendors must be able to extend the Android platform to sup-
port their custom functionality and yet maintain such assur-
ances to their customers. Android’s implementation of filesys-
tem access control is one of the most important defenses for
providing such assurances.
While Android adopted advanced access control meth-
ods aggressively, such as SEAndroid mandatory access con-
trol [42] (MAC), in combination with various traditional ac-
cess control methods, such as UNIX discretionary access
control (DAC), many vulnerabilities in filesystem access have
still been reported. In one recent case reported by Check-
point [33], an untrusted application abused write permission
to Android’s external storage to replace other applications’ li-
brary files with fake library files before the victim application
installs them, in what is known as a file squatting attack. In
another instance reported by researchers from IOActive [31],
a vulnerability in the DownloadProvider allowed untrusted
applications to read/write unauthorized files by providing a
maliciously crafted URI that causes a victim’s Download-
Provider to access an untrusted symbolic link that redirects
the victim to the targeted files, which is called a link traversal
attack. This vulnerability could have serious effects since
some over-the-air update files, including for some privileged
applications, are also downloaded by the DownloadProvider.
Researchers have proposed automated policy analysis to
detect misconfigurations that may expose vulnerabilities in
complex access control policies [2, 28], but application of
these methods to Android does not address: (1) how those
policies may be altered by adversaries and (2) how to detect
which operations adversaries may actually be able to em-
ploy in attacks on those misconfigurations. The emergence
of Android with its rich permission system and its subse-
quent adoption of the SEAndroid mandatory access control
motivated the development of policy analysis methods for
Android systems [4,17,54,55]. However, each of these initial
approaches only considered a single type of access control
policy (e.g., either SEAndroid or Android permissions). Re-
cently, work has been proposed to compute the information
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flows of combined MAC and DAC policies [13], including
Linux capabilities as well [24]. However, these techniques
miss some attacks, such as the recent Checkpoint and IOAc-
tive attacks referenced above, because they lack methods to
detect how adversaries may broaden their ability to launch
attacks by manipulating the flexibility inherent in the UNIX
DAC and Android permission systems. In addition, these tech-
niques may identify many spurious threats because they do
not determine whether adversaries can really launch attacks
for the threats found.
In this paper, we aim to develop a method to triage An-
droid filesystem access control policies by: (1) identifying the
resources applications are authorized to use that are modifi-
able by their adversaries, accounting for policy manipulations,
and (2) determining the attack operations on those resources
available to adversaries to enable testing the victims for vul-
nerabilities. Like several prior works in access control policy
analysis [2,14,28,29], our method starts by identifying filesys-
tem resources at risk by computing the integrity violations
authorized. An integrity violation occurs when an access con-
trol policy authorizes a lower-integrity subject (adversary) to
modify a resource used by a higher-integrity subject (victim).
However, an integrity violation may not imply a vulnerabil-
ity because: (1) victims may not actually use the impacted
resource and/or (2) adversaries may not be able to exploit
the victim’s use of the resource. Predicting the resources a
program may use in advance is a difficult challenge, so we
focus instead on computing whether and how an adversary
could attempt to exploit a victim’s use. For each integrity
violation, we compute the ways that adversaries may launch
attacks, which we call attack operations.
To compute attack operations for Android systems com-
prehensively and accurately, we leverage the insight that ad-
versaries may exploit flexibility in Android access control to
expand the permissions available to themselves and/or victims
to launch attack operations, which we call permission expan-
sion. DAC protection systems allow resource owners to grant
permissions to their resources arbitrarily, making prediction
of whether an unsafe permission may be granted intractable
in general [26]. Adversaries can leverage such flexibility to
grant victims permissions to lure them to resources to which
adversaries can launch attack operations. In addition, Android
systems convert many Android permissions that adversaries
may obtain into DAC permissions, leading to further risks.
While SEAndroid MAC policies bound such permissions,
these MAC policies are sufficiently coarse that changes in
DAC permissions may reveal many new attack operations
within the MAC restrictions.
We build a static access control analysis tool called
PolyScope that computes attack operations on filesys-
tem resources from Android access control policies and
host/program configurations. PolyScope is targeted for use
by Android system vendors (OEMs) who often extend base
Android systems with a variety of vendor-specific services
and applications to customize their products with value-added
functionality. OEMs must then configure Android access con-
trol to protect their value-added functionality and the system’s
trusted computing base, OEMs face challenges in determin-
ing whether the resultant access control configurations reveal
new vulnerabilities. In Section 7.6 we describe vulnerabilities
caused by misconfiguration of access control policies for two
such value-added functionalities. PolyScope enables OEMs
to compute the attack operations that third-party apps may
launch against their functionality to identify actions that may
lead to vulnerabilities or at least require vulnerability testing.
In addition, OEMs can also use PolyScope to compute the
attack operations that their vendor-specific services and appli-
cations may be able to launch, should they be compromised,
against the Android services to evaluate protection of their
system’s trusted computing base.
Our evaluation in Section 7 demonstrates that PolyScope
has several benefits over prior analysis approaches and is
practical to use. First, in a study of seven freshly installed
Android releases1, three Google Android versions and four
OEM Android versions, we find that permission expansion
increases the number of integrity violations significantly, from
(122% to 1550%) across versions. However, between 14%
and 21% of those integrity violations cannot be transformed
into attack operations by the filesystem and/or program con-
figurations. Second, PolyScope finds that OEM releases have
a significantly greater number of attack operations than the
Google releases. Using these attack operations uncovered by
PolyScope, we find two new vulnerabilities in three OEM re-
leases through manual analysis. One of these new vulnerabili-
ties requires permission expansion to exploit, demonstrating
the power of PolyScope. Finally, we implement an analysis
method in PolyScope that enables parallel validation of poten-
tial integrity violations, resulting in significant performance
improvements for the studied systems, ranging from 70% to
84% improvement across releases. This suggests that OEMs
may benefit from applying PolyScope incrementally to iden-
tify attack operations as they extend their systems with new
value-added features.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose the PolyScope analysis tool for Android
filesystem access control. PolyScope composes An-
droid’s access control policies and relevant system con-
figurations to compute the attack operations available to
adversaries, accounting for permission expansion.
• We use PolyScope to triage three Google and five OEM
Android releases. We find a significantly greater number
of attack operations for OEM’s Android releases, indi-
cating that OEMs may greatly benefit from PolyScope
as they customize their Android-based products.
1We examine an eighth system in some experiments, which has a signifi-
cantly greater number of pre-installed apps.
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Figure 1: DownloadProvider Vulnerability: (1) Adversary
provides pathname to victim (as URI) to (2) lure the victim
to an adversary-created symbolic link (a) that (3) the victim
resolves to the target file enabling the adversary to modify the
file indirectly through the victim (b).
• We identify two new vulnerabilities in OEM Android
releases. Using PolyScope results, we identify vulnera-
bilities in: (1) the Thememanager used by Xiaomi and
Huawei and (2) Samsung’s Resestreason logging.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 mo-
tivates the need for more effective access control analysis.
Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed PolyScope
approach. Section 4 defines our threat model. Sections 5
and 6 describe the design and implementation of PolyScope.
Section 7 performs a variety of experiments to show how
PolyScope triages access control policies in Android releases.
Section 8 describes current limitations and how they may be
addressed. Section 9 examines differences from related work.
Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
In this section, we motivate the goals of our work. We first
present an example of the challenge of detecting the attack
operations that may lead to vulnerabilities in Android systems
in Section 2.1. After outlining current approaches to access
control policy analysis in Section 2.2, we describe their key
limitations in Section 2.3.
2.1 An Example Vulnerability
A recent vulnerability discovered in Android services using
the DownloadProvider allows untrusted apps to gain access to
privileged files [31]. The DownloadProvider enables services
to retrieve files on behalf of apps by a URI specifying the loca-
tion of a file. An untrusted app may lure a service’s Download-
Provider into using a maliciously crafted URI that resolves
to a symbolic link created by the untrusted app. Through this
symbolic link, the untrusted app can access any file to which
the service is authorized, which may include some privileged
files. This is an example of a link traversal attack.
Figure 1 shows exploitation of the vulnerability. The ad-
versary sends a request URI (Pathname in Figure 1) to the
victim (service running DownloadProvider) 1 that directs
the victim to a symbolic link created by the adversary a .
When the victim uses its read permission to the symbolic link
2 , the operating system resolves the link 3 to return access
to the target file. This vulnerability may enable the adversary
to leak and/or modify the target file b to which the adversary
normally lacks access.
This vulnerability occurred because adversaries of the ser-
vice have the permission to create a symbolic link in a di-
rectory to which the service running DownloadProvider also
has access. Android access control aims to limit the expo-
sure of services to directories modifiable by third-party apps
and other adversaries, but sometimes functional requirements
demand such permissions be made available. In addition, An-
droid systems allow apps to extend their own permissions by
obtaining Android permissions and to grant services permis-
sion to access app directories, expanding the directories at
risk.
2.2 Access Control Policy Analysis
Seminal work in access control policy analysis [2, 28] pro-
posed computing authorized information flows among sub-
jects and objects from a system’s access control policies. An
access control policy authorizes an information flow from a
subject to an object if the policy allows that subject to per-
form an operation that modifies the object, called a write-like
operation, and authorizes an information flow from an object
to a subject if the policy allows that subject to perform an op-
eration that uses the object’s data, called a read-like operation
(e.g., read or execute). Some operations may be both read-like
and write-like, enabling information flow in both directions.
However, modern Android systems have hundreds of thou-
sands of access control rules, so there are many, many autho-
rized information flows. Researchers then explored methods
to find the information flows associated with potential security
problems. Some access control analyses focus on identifying
secrecy problems [4,13,17,54,55] and others on integrity prob-
lems [14,29]. In the example above, this vulnerability permits
attacks on process integrity by controlling the file retrieved by
the victim process, whereby the compromised process may be
directed to leak or modify files on behalf of the adversary. To
detect integrity problems, access control analyses are inspired
by integrity models, such Biba integrity [7], to detect infor-
mation flows from adversaries to victims. Such information
flows are called integrity violations, which are defined more
formally as a tuple of resource, adversary, and victim, where
the access control policy authorizes an information flow from
the adversary to the resource (i.e., the adversary is authorized
to perform a write-like operation on the resource) and autho-
rizes an information flow from the resource to the victim (i.e.,
the victim is authorized to perform a read-like operation on
the resource).
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Figure 2: PolyScope Logical Flow: PolyScope computes per-subject adversaries, permission expansion by those adversaries,
the integrity violations adversaries are authorized, and the attack operations adversaries may perform to attack victims.
2.3 Limitations of Current Techniques
Access control policy analyses attempt to solve three main
problems to help identify vulnerabilities, but current ap-
proaches suffer from key limitations on each problem.
The first problem in using access control policy analysis
is to identify the adversaries who may benefit from ex-
ploitation of each subject. Previous research often identifies
untrusted apps2 as adversaries, and assumed that system ser-
vices and OEM’s value-added apps and services were trusted.
However, as OEMs push more functionality into their own
Android distributions, they deploy a variety of new and mod-
ified apps and services whose trustworthiness may vary. A
recent study [19] reveals that some OEM pre-installed code
has a lack of end-to-end quality control and might even lever-
age code from third parties, resulting in back doors and other
vulnerabilities [39]. By ignoring OEM apps and services, we
risk missing attacks that utilize them as stepping stones to
exploit Android system services. However, we must be care-
ful not to overapproximate adversaries, which leads to false
positives.
The second problem is to determine the permissions ad-
versaries control to create integrity violations that may
enable attacks. Recent access control analysis methods that
reason about multiple access control policies [13, 24] do not
account for how an adversary may exploit flexibility in those
policy models to manipulate permissions to increase the in-
tegrity violations they may attempt to exploit. In Android
systems, both the DAC access control model and the Android
permission system allow untrusted parties to modify policies.
While in theory MAC policies could be used instead to govern
access to prevent such problems, MAC policies tend to be
more complex to configure and are unforgiving if a needed
permission is not granted. Thus, we have found that OEMs
often configure DAC policies to protect their value-added
apps and services and allow users to choose some authoriza-
tions using Android permissions. Researchers have previously
identified problems caused by DAC policy flexibility, rang-
ing from the inability to predict whether an unauthorized
permission could be granted [26] to the inability to prevent
compromised subjects from propagating attacks [32].
The third problem is to compute the operations that an
2Includes apps assigned to the SEAndroid domains untrusted_app and
isolated_app. Information on SEAndroid domains appears in Section 5.1.
adversary may be authorized to employ to launch attacks,
which we call attack operations. Once we know that a true
adversary may be authorized permissions that enable integrity
violations, a question is how an adversary may utilize such
permissions to launch attacks. While integrity violations are
a necessary precondition to launch an attack, other configu-
rations may prevent some operations useful for attacks. An-
droid systems provide a variety of ad hoc configurations that
could prevent some attack operations. For example, Android
employs filesystem configurations to prevent symbolic links
from being created in external storage directories, which can
prevent link traversal attacks like the example above. In ad-
dition, Android systems have also introduced a specialized
FileProvider class that requires that clients open files for their
servers, which also can prevent link traversal attacks. How-
ever, such ad hoc configurations are only employed sporad-
ically, and recently suggested configuration operations also
provide incomplete defense (see Section 8.2).
3 PolyScope Overview
In this paper, we present a new Android access control analy-
sis tool, called PolyScope, that computes the set of authorized
attack operations for an Android system while overcoming the
prior limitations described above. Figure 2 shows PolyScope’s
approach. In Step 1, PolyScope identifies the adversaries for
each subject using definitions of mutual trust validated against
an approach that computes worst-case, as described in Sec-
tion 5.2. In Step 2, PolyScope determines the permissions
adversaries control by modeling how adversaries may expand
permissions available to themselves and their victims by ex-
ploiting the flexibility in Android access control policies, as
described in Section 5.3. In Step 3, PolyScope uses these
expanded permissions to compute integrity violations based
on integrity violation rules defined in Section 5.4. In Step
4, PolyScope uses these integrity violations to compute the
types of attack operations possible using attack operation
rules defined in Section 5.5. We identify the specific types of
integrity violations and attack operations we consider in this
paper in Section 4.
PolyScope computes integrity violations and attack opera-
tions to triage Android releases for vulnerabilities induced by
access control policies. Integrity violations identify the filesys-
tem resources that victims are authorized to access that their
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Figure 3: Integrity Violation (IV) Classes: (1) File-IVs grant
adversaries direct access to modify files that victims use; (2)
Binding-IVs grant adversaries the ability to modify name reso-
lution of file names; and (3) Pathname-IVs enable adversaries
to lure victims to the part of the filesystem they can modify.
adversaries are authorized to modify (see Section 2.2). Attack
operations specify the types of operations that adversaries are
capable of performing in modifying filesystem resources to
launch attacks. Using this information, an analyst can detect
the victim operations that risk compromise by using a filesys-
tem resource in an integrity violation and the types of attack
operations for which should be tested. Detecting whether the
victim is vulnerable requires testing the victim against in-
stances of these attack operations. In Section 6, we describe
some ways to detect victim operations, and we find two new
vulnerabilities from subsequent testing in Section 7.6.
4 Threat Model
In this paper, adversaries may modify any part of the filesys-
tem to which they are authorized. Adversaries may modify a
part of the filesystem that a potential victim may be authorized
to use and/or may send arbitrary requests (e.g., IPCs) to vic-
tim processes to which they are authorized to communicate.
These scenarios result in integrity violations (IVs), which we
aim to compute accurately. We assume that an adversary will
try to exploit any integrity violation using any attack opera-
tions they are allowed to run to exploit the victim’s use of the
associated files.
In this paper, we aim to triage systems for three classes of
integrity violations that authorize adversaries to perform at-
tack operations on filesystem access, covering a wide variety
of vulnerabilities including confused deputy [25] and time-
of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) vulnerabilities [8, 34].
Related to Figure 1, we show these integrity violation classes
in Figure 3. First, file-IVs allow adversaries to modify tar-
get files that are authorized to victims directly 1 , possibly
leading victims to unexpected use adversary-controlled data.
Second, binding-IVs enable adversaries to redirect victims
to target files during name resolution 2 , causing victims to
operate on files chosen by adversaries. Third, pathname-IVs
enable adversaries to lure victims to an adversary-controlled
part of the filesystem using an adversary-supplied pathname
3 , which is the integrity violation exploited in the example
vulnerability of Section 2.1.
For each integrity violation found, we assume that an ad-
versary may attempt any possible attack operation. In general,
attack operations enable adversaries to provide malicious in-
put to victims by getting them to use an adversary-controlled
file or binding to enable the adversary to choose the input to
the victim, whose basic approaches date to the 1970s [34].
File-IV attack operations simply modify the resource await-
ing use by the victim. Binding-IV attack operations direct
the victim to a resource chosen by the adversary, using link
traversal or file squatting attacks. A link traversal attack aims
to exploit a victim as a confused deputy [25] by directing
the victim to access a resource to which the adversary is not
authorized. A file squatting attack aims to exploit a victim
by planting an adversary-controlled resource at a location
where the victim expects a protected file, like attacks on file-
IVs. Both types of attack operations may exploit TOCTTOU
flaws [8], if present, in the victim. Pathname-IVs attack oper-
ations lure a victim who processes pathnames (e.g., URLs) to
an adversary-controlled binding to exploit a link traversal.
In developing PolyScope, we assume trust in some compo-
nents of Android systems. First, we assume that the Android
operating system operates correctly, including enforcement
of its access control policies and system configurations cor-
rectly. For example, we trust the Android operating system
to satisfy the reference monitor concept [5]. We note that
the Android operating system includes the Linux operating
system and a variety of system services. Our assumptions
about trust among such services is determined using Android
specifications, as described in Section 5.2.
5 PolyScope Design
In this section, we examine the design challenges in com-
puting attack operations for Android systems. In particular,
after providing some brief background information, we fo-
cus on four key steps outlined in the PolyScope overview in
Section 3.
5.1 Design Background
In this section, we aim to provide background on the various
access control techniques employed by Android systems nec-
essary to understand the PolyScope design. Android deploys
SEAndroid mandatory access control (MAC), Linux/UNIX
discretionary access control (DAC), the Android permission
system, and Linux capabilities to control access to filesystem
resources directly or indirectly. Linux capabilities have no
tangible impact on contributing attack operations on recent
Android versions, so we do not discuss them further. Using
the remaining models, we define PolyScope’s interpretation
of subjects and objects applied in policy analysis.
SEAndroid MAC: SEAndroid is a port of SELinux manda-
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tory access control system [1] with additional support for
Android mechanisms, such as Binder IPC. SEAndroid sup-
ports three access control models: Type Enforcement (TE),
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Multi-Level Secu-
rity (MLS). All the models are mandatory access control
models (MAC) in that they are defined by the system and are
not intended to be modified by users or their programs. Out
of these three, the TE model acts as the primary enforcement
model to protect the integrity of the Android system’s trusted
computing base processes. MLS is deployed mainly to sepa-
rate apps from one another. On the other hand, RBAC does
not receive much use currently on Android, so we will not
describe it further.
The SEAndroid TE policy3 defines authorization rules in
terms of security labels [9], where a subject can perform an op-
eration on an object if there is a rule authorizing the subject’s
security label to perform the operation on object’s security la-
bel. The SEAndroid MLS policy enables subjects and objects
to be associated with categories [6], where subjects can only
perform operations on objects when the subject is authorized
for the object’s category.
Linux/UNIX DAC: Android systems also utilize traditional
UNIX discretionary access control (DAC) as provided by
the Linux system on which Android is based. UNIX DAC
associates files with a UID for the file owner and a GID for the
file group. Processes are also associated with a process UID
and GID, but a process may additionally belong to a set of
supplementary groups. A process can perform an operation on
a file if: (1) the file’s UID is the same as the process’s UID and
the file owner is authorized to perform that operation; (2) the
file’s GID matches one of the process’s groups (i.e., process’s
GID or supplementary) and the file group is authorized to
perform that operation; or (3) any process UID (i.e., others) is
authorized to perform that operation for that file. Importantly,
UNIX DAC allows a process to modify file permissions when
the process’s UID is the same as the file’s owner UID.
Rather than associating UID’s with individual users, as is
traditional, Android associates UIDs with individual services
and apps. Thus, services and apps "own" a set of files (i.e.,
with the app’s UID as the file owner UID) for which they may
modify permissions. Thus, malicious apps can change the
permissions for files they own, which is important for luring
victims to create pathname-IVs.
Android Permission System: Android permissions are em-
ployed to control access to app and service data. Android
data/service providers enforce most Android permissions, but
some Android permissions are mapped to DAC supplemen-
tary groups, which are assigned to apps when the associated
Android permission is granted. Thus, Android permissions
may add DAC supplementary groups to app processes, grant-
ing them additional filesystem permissions.
3Note that in this paper we sometimes refer to the "MAC TE" policy,
which is the same as the SEAndroid TE policy.
Note that each Android permission has an associated pro-
tection level that is used to determine whether or not an ap-
plication may be granted that permission. Over time, the per-
mission granting policy has become more complex [58]. Cur-
rently, permissions with the "normal" protection level are
automatically granted to applications. However, permissions
with the "dangerous" protection level (e.g., guarding sensi-
tive personal data such as GPS) require additional runtime
authorization from the user. Permissions with the "signature"
protection level can only be granted to applications signed by
the same developer key that was used to define the permission.
The signature protection level is primarily used to restrict ac-
cess to functionality that only system applications should
access. Finally, there are several other flags that provide ad
hoc restrictions, e.g., a "privileged" flag allows privileged,
OEM-bundled applications to acquire associated permissions.
Mapping MAC and DAC Policies: To reason about access
control for the combined DAC and MAC policies, PolyScope
needs to determine how to map MAC policies in the form
of TE security labels and MLS categories to DAC policies
in the form of UIDs and groups. Fortunately, Android makes
such determination straightforward. Files and directories are
explicitly assigned both MAC and DAC information directly,
so there is no possibility of ambiguity. For processes, the
mapping between MAC and DAC information is indirect.
Android assigns the same MAC TE security label, MAC MLS
category, DAC UID, and DAC groups4 to each program when
it is run, as identified by Chen et al. [13]. Thus, we collect the
MAC-DAC mapping for processes by running programs. For
all apps and services we have run, this relationship has held,
but this implies that we can only perform policy analysis for
apps and services installed on the release (i.e., that we can
run). We use this information to define subjects and objects
for PolyScope analysis as follows.
• Subjects: Each process is associated with a subject de-
fined by its MAC TE label, MLS category set, DAC
UID, and a set of DAC groups (GID and supplemental
groups). There may be many processes associated with
one subject.
• Objects: Each resource is associated with an object de-
fined by its MAC TE label, MLS category set, DAC
UID/GID, and mode bits (i.e., owner, group, others per-
missions). There may be many files/directories associ-
ated with one object.
PolyScope reasons about access control policies in terms of
subjects and objects, rather than individual processes and re-
sources, as the definitions of subjects and objects form equiv-
alence classes with respect to adversaries. All processes of
the same subject share the same adversaries, and all resource
4The complete set of supplementary groups assigned to a program’s
processes depend on the Android permissions obtained for the program. We
define the assumption we use for PolyScope in Section 5.3.
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associated with the same object are modifiable by the same
adversaries. Thus, we express PolyScope results in terms of
subjects and objects in Section 7.
5.2 Compute Per-Subject Adversaries
A challenge is to identify the adversaries for each subject. Re-
searchers often identify subjects adversaries based untrusted
sources (e.g., Chen et al. [13] used third-party apps as ad-
versaries) or based on their role in the system (e.g., Jaeger
et al. [29] said only core system services could be trusted).
A problem is that these approaches are one-dimensional and
ad hoc. Since they are ad hoc, the likelihood of missing pos-
sible attack sources or identifying trusted sources as false
adversaries is greater. Since they are one-dimensional (i.e.,
either focusing on trust or not), there is no basis to determine
whether adversaries are missing or misclassified.
We propose to develop a method for computing adversaries
that considers both the best-case and worst-case trust to derive
and validate per-subject adversary sets. For the worst case,
we leverage the conservative integrity wall approach of Vi-
jayakumar et al. [51]. The integrity wall approach makes the
insight that only the subjects that can trivially compromise a
subject’s program must be trusted, thus computing a minimal
trusted computing base (TCB) (i.e., fewest subjects trusted)
of subjects for each program. For the best case, we utilize
the process privilege levels defined by Google [23], which
groups subjects in classes by whether they should be mutually
trustworthy. By examining trust from two directions, we can
perform validation on whether the combination is consistent.
While this approach enables just one type of limited valida-
tion, we are not aware of any prior work validating adversary
sets.
The integrity wall method computes per-subject TCBs by
detecting whether either one of two requirements are met: (1)
that subject must trust any other subjects that are authorized to
modify files that the subject may execute (i.e., its executable
and library files) and (2) that subject must trust any other
subjects that are authorized to modify kernel resources. We
compute worst-case per-subject TCBs from MAC TE policies.
On the other hand, Android specifies "privilege levels" [23]
that describe which subjects should mutually trust one another,
implying a best-case TCB. Google defines six privilege levels
in an Android system [23], which we group into five levels
for evaluation in Section 7: (T5) root processes; (T4) system
processes; (T3) service processes; (T2) trusted application
processes; (T1) untrusted application processes and isolated
process. Isolated apps and untrusted apps are separated into
distinct privilege levels by Google, but in this paper, we do
not consider attacks on untrusted apps by the lower privileged
isolated apps. Table 1 lists these privilege levels based on
their UID and MAC labels.
Using Google’s privilege levels, we assume a subject trusts
all of the subjects at its level or higher. For example, untrusted
apps trust other untrusted apps and any subjects at higher
privilege levels, such as the Android system services (e.g.,
system server). Trusting subjects at higher privilege levels
is accepted because such subjects provide functionality that
the subjects at lower privilege levels depend upon. However,
assuming untrusted apps may be mutually trusting may be
harder to accept, but we are not looking for attacks between
untrusted apps in this paper. Resolving how to identify ad-
versaries among untrusted apps, such as determining whether
mutual trust for all is appropriate, is future work.
To produce an accurate adversary set, we validate consis-
tency between the best-case and worst-case trust sets to derive
an adversary set that is consistent with both trust sets. Specif-
ically, PolyScope validates whether the worst-case trust set
for each subject is a subset of that subject’s best-case trust set.
If so, then there does not exist an adversary of any subject rel-
ative to its best-case trust set (i.e., fewest adversaries) that is
not also an adversary relative to that subject’s worst-case trust
set (i.e., maximal adversaries). An inconsistency implies that
the Android privilege levels are missing a fundamental trust
requirement to prevent trivially compromising the subject.
5.3 Compute Permission Expansion
A key difficulty for OEMs is predicting which resources may
be accessible to adversaries and victims to derive attack op-
erations accurately. A problem is that while MAC policies
are essentially fixed (i.e., between software updates), DAC
permissions may be modified by adversaries to increase the
attack operations that they could execute. We identify two
ways that adversaries may modify permission assignments
on Android systems: (1) adversaries may obtain Android per-
missions that augment their own DAC permissions and (2)
adversaries may delegate DAC permissions for objects that
they own to potential victims. For some Android permissions,
adversaries gain new DAC permissions to access additional
resources that may enable attacks. By delegating DAC per-
missions to objects they own, adversaries may lure potential
victims to resources that adversaries control.
Adversary Permission Expansion: In Android systems,
some Android permissions are implemented using DAC
groups. As described above, a process is associated with a
single UID and GID, but also an arbitrarily large set of supple-
mentary groups that enable further "group" permissions. Thus,
when a user grants an Android permission associated with one
or more DAC groups to an app, there is a direct expansion of
that app’s permissions in terms of its DAC permissions. Since
the MAC policies are generally lenient in Android systems,
these new DAC permissions may grant privileges that enable
attacks. For PolyScope, we assume that subjects can obtain
all of their "normal" Android permissions and are granted
all of their "dangerous" permissions by users for analysis, as
described in the previous section. One of the vulnerability
case studies we highlight in Section 7.6 exploits adversary
permission expansion.
Victim Permission Expansion: Researchers have long
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Table 1: Google’s Process Privilege Levels [23]
Process Level1 Level Membership Requirements
Root Process (T5) Process running with UID root (e.g., MAC labels kernel and init)
System Process (T4) Process running with UID system (e.g., MAC label system server)
Service Process (T3) AOSP core service providers (e.g., MAC labels bluetooth and mediaserver)
Trusted Application Process (T2) AOSP default and vendor apps (e.g., MAC labels platform_app and priv_app)
Untrusted Application Process (T1) Third-party applications (e.g., MAC label untrusted_app)
Isolated Process (T0) Processes that are expected to receive adversarial inputs (e.g., MAC label webview)
1 Listing types of processes based on their privilege level, from high to low with root processes being most privileged (T5) and isolated processes being the
least privileged (T0). We group T0 and T1 together calling the resultant level T1 in the evaluation in Section 7.
known that allowing untrusted subjects (i.e., adversaries in
our case) to administer DAC permissions for objects that they
own can present difficulties in predicting possible permission
assignments. Researchers proved that the safety problem for
a typical DAC protection system, i.e., an access matrix for
subjects and objects where objects and permissions may be
added in a single command, is undecidable in the general
case [26]. The safety problem asks whether there exists a
general algorithm to predict whether a particular unsafe per-
mission will ever be granted to a particular subject given an
initial state. As a result, researchers explored alternative DAC
models for which the safety problem could be solved, such as
the take-grant model [30], the typed access matrix [40], and
policy constraints [46].
Using the ability to manage DAC permissions to objects
they own, adversaries can grant permissions to their resources
to victims, expanding the set of resources that victims may be
lured to use. In many cases, victims have MAC permissions
that grant them access to adversary directories, but vendors
use DAC permissions to block access. However, since ad-
versaries own these directories, they can simply grant the
removed permissions to potential victims themselves.
We can predict the permissions available to victims despite
the undecidability of the safety problem because we do not
have to solve the general problem. First, we find the resources
to which the victim has MAC permissions to access and the
adversaries own. Only those resources are worth granting
DAC permissions, as the victim can only access if it has MAC
permissions as well. Thus, the number of objects on which
DAC permissions may be usefully granted to victims is finite.
5.4 Compute Integrity Violations
In this section, we show how to compute integrity violations
for file-IVs, binding-IVs, and pathname-IVs defined in Sec-
tion 4. Recall from Section 2.2 that integrity violations are
a tuple of resource, adversary, and victim, where the adver-
sary is authorized to modify the resource and the victim is
authorized to use (e.g., read, write, or execute) the resource.
Computing File Integrity Violations: A file vulnerability
may be possible if a subject uses (read, write, or execute) a
file that can be modified by an adversary. In practice, many
subjects read files their adversaries may write (read-IVs)
with adequate defenses, but risks are greater if the subject
executes (exec-IVs) or also modifies such files (write-IVs).
For exec-IVs, executing input from an adversary enables an
adversary to control a victim’s executable code. For write-IVs,
if a subject writes to a file its adversaries also may write, then
adversaries may be able to undo or replace valid content.
{read|write|exec}(file, victim) && // victim has access to file,
adv-expand(adversary) && // but adversary-expanded perms
write(file, adversary) // enables to modify file
→
{read|write|exec}-IV(file, victim, adversary)
This rule determines whether the victim is authorized by
the combination of access control policies for reading, writing,
or executing files, using the {read|write|exec} predicate.
The rule accounts for the adversary’s expansion of their own
permissions, as indicated by the predicate adv-expand. If
the adversary also has write permission to the file (write
predicate), then the associated integrity violation is created.
Computing Binding Integrity Violations: A binding vul-
nerability is possible if a subject may use a binding in resolv-
ing a file name that adversaries can modify.
use(binding, victim) && // victim can use binding,
adv-expand(adversary) && // but adversary-expanded perms
write(binding, adversary) // enable to modify binding
→
binding-IV(binding, victim, adversary)
This rule parallels the rule for file-IVs, except that this rule
applies to a victim having the permission to use a binding in
name resolution (use predicate).
Computing Pathname Integrity Violations: Pathname in-
tegrity violations are a type of binding integrity violation that
are possible when a subject uses input from adversary to deter-
mine the bindings to use in name resolution. These integrity
violations place additional requirements on the adversary to
be authorized to communicate with the victim. In addition,
adversaries can apply victim permission expansion to lure vic-
tims to a larger set of bindings the adversaries are authorized
to modify.
write(ipc, adversary, victim) && // may send IPCs to victim
vic-expand(adversary, victim) && // and expand victim perms
binding-IV(binding, victim, adversary) // to lure victim to binding
→
pathname-IV(binding, victim, adversary)
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Adversaries must be granted write privilege to communi-
cate to the victim, as defined in the write predicate. Android
services may use Binder IPCs, and we further limit write
to use IPCs that communicate URLs for Android services.
The adversary can use victim expansion to increase the set
of bindings the victim is authorized to use by vic-expand.
If that binding meets the requirements of a binding-IV (see
above), then a pathname-IV is also possible for this victim.
5.5 Compute Attack Operations
We define how PolyScope computes attack operations from
the integrity violations computed in the last section and the
relevant system configurations. We identify four types of
attack operations that an adversary could use to exploit the
three types of integrity violations: (1) file modification for file
IVs; (2) file squatting for binding-IVs; (3) link traversal for
binding-IVs; and (4) luring traversal for pathname-IVs.
File Modification Attacks: For read/write/exec IVs, the at-
tack operation is to modify the objects involved in each IV.
However, Android uses some read-only filesystems, so not
all files to which adversaries have write privilege are really
modifiable. Thus, the rule for file modification operations ad-
ditionally checks whether the file is in a writable filesystem.
{read|write|exec}-IV(file, victim, adversary) &&
fs-writable(file) // file’s filesystem is writable
→
file-mod(file, victim, adversary)
File Squatting Attack: In a file squatting attack, adversaries
plant files that they expect that the victim will access. The
adversary grants access to the victim to allow the victim to use
the adversary-controlled file. This attack operation gives the
adversary control of the content of a file that the victim will
use. To perform a file squatting attack operation, the adversary
must really be able to write to the directory to plant the file.
Thus, the rule for file squatting operations is essentially the
same as for file modification, but applies to binding-IVs.
binding-IV(binding, victim, adversary) &&
fs-writable(binding) // binding’s filesystem is writable
→
file-squat(binding, victim, adversary)
In this rule, we assume that the adversary predict the file-
names used by the victim. In the future, we will explore
extending the rule to account for that capability.
Link Traversal: A link traversal attack is implemented by
planting a symbolic link at a binding modifiable by the adver-
sary, as described in Section 2.1. However, Android also uses
some filesystem configurations that prohibit symbolic links,
so not all bindings to which adversaries have write privilege
and are in writable filesystems allow the creation of the sym-
bolic links necessary to perform link traversals. Thus, the rule
for link traversal operations extends the rule for file squatting
to account for this additional requirement.
binding-IV(binding, victim, adversary) &&
symlink(binding) && // binding’s filesystem allows symlinks
fs-writable(binding) // binding’s filesystem is writable
→
link-traversal(binding, victim, adversary)
Luring Traversal: An adversary may lure a victim to a bind-
ing controlled by the adversary to launch an attack operation.
However, Android systems also offer a defense to prevent
luring the victim to open files on behalf of adversaries in the
form of the FileProvider class. Specifically, the FileProvider
class requires that clients open files themselves and provide
the FileProvider with the resultant file descriptor. Since the
clients open the file, they perform any name resolution, so the
potential victim is no longer prone to pathname vulnerabil-
ities. Thus, the rule for luring traversal operations extends
the rule for link traversal for pathname-IVs by requiring the
absence of any FileProvider class usage. OEMs still have
many services and privileged apps that do not employ the
FileProvider class, so there remain several opportunities for
pathname-IVs to be attacked.
pathname-IV(binding, victim, adversary) &&
symlink(binding) && // binding’s filesystem allows symlinks
fs-writable(binding) && // binding’s filesystem is writable
no-file-provider(victim) // victim does not employ fileprovider
→
luring-traversal(binding, file, victim, adversary)
While it is possible that the victim has implemented an ex-
tra defense in Android middleware (e.g., Customized Android
Permission) to prevent IPCs, we do not yet account for these
defenses, as these permissions are ad hoc. Including these
defenses is future work.
6 Implementation
The PolyScope tool is implemented fully in Python in about
1500 SLOC and is compatible with Android version 5.0 and
above. After Data Collection gathers access control policies,
PolyScope implements the logical flow shown in Figure 2 in
a slightly different manner described below. First, PolyScope
computes integrity violations in steps one to three in Figure 2,
but only for the SEAndroid TE policy, which we call TE IV
Computation. Next, PolyScope computes whether the TE in-
tegrity violations are authorized by the remaining Android
access control policies by re-running steps two and three in
Figure 2, but only for resources associated with the TE IVs,
which we call TE IV Validation. This separation enables us to
parallelize the validation step, which has a significant perfor-
mance impact, see Section 7.7. Finally, PolyScope leverages
the validated IVs to Compute Attack Operations. Below, we
discuss these major phases of the implementation, and how
we use the results in Testing for Vulnerabilities.
Data Collection: We implemented multiple data collection
scripts that collect access control data for the subjects and
objects from an Android phone. The methods are relatively
straightforward for accessible files and processes, detailed in
Appendix A.1. However, we are not authorized to access all
files, particularly those owned by root, so we run these scripts
on rooted phones. Recent work by Hernandez et al. [24] is able
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to extract MAC policy and part of DAC configuration from
Android firmware images without rooting devices. However,
it has difficulty obtaining files located in some directories like
/data. As shown in Table 1 of their paper [24], about 75%
of the files’ DAC configuration in /data cannot be retrieved,
which we extract with our scripts.
TE IV Computation: To compute per-subject adversaries in
Step 1 of Figure 2, PolyScope leverages the integrity wall [51]
and Android privilege levels [23], as described in Section 5.2.
We follow the procedure defined in the integrity wall paper for
Linux [51], except we add objects upon which Android kernel
integrity depends (e.g., rootfs and selinuxfs) to the set of
kernel objects. Since the SEAndroid TE policy is immutable
(i.e., modulo system upgrades), Step 2 of Figure 2 is not re-
quired. In Step 3, PolyScope computes the integrity violations
authorized by the TE policy, as specified in Section 5.4.
TE IV Validation: After the TE IVs are identified, PolyScope
validates whether these TE IVs are also authorized for the
combination of remaining Android access control policies:
UNIX DAC, SEAndroid MLS, and Android permissions. Step
1 of Figure 2 is not rerun. In Step 2, PolyScope converts An-
droid permissions to authorized DAC subgroups for adversary
expansion and identifies the objects owned by each subject for
victim expansion, as described in Section 5.3. In Step 3, each
TE IV is evaluated to determine whether SEAndroid MLS and
DAC policies also authorize the victim and adversary of each
IV the permissions necessary to justify an integrity violation.
As mentioned above, the set of TE IVs can be partitioned to
validate them in parallel.
Compute Attack Operations: PolyScope then computes the
attack operations for the IVs using the filesystem and pro-
gram configurations as described in Section 5.5. PolyScope
collects the relevant filesystem configurations by parsing the
associated mount options. PolyScope collects the relevant
program configurations (i.e., whether the victim includes a
recommended defense, the FileProvider class) by reverse en-
gineering the application’s apk package to detect the presence
of the FileProvider class. We validated the ability or inability
to perform attack operations and found no discrepancies.
Testing for Vulnerabilities: The ultimate goal is to deter-
mine whether the victim is vulnerable to any of the attack
operations. However, a key challenge is to determine whether
and when a victim may actually access a resource associated
with an attack operation. Just because a potential victim may
be authorized to use a resource, does not mean it ever uses
that resource. Even if a potential victim may use a resource
associated with an attack operation, we need to determine the
conditions when such an access is performed. Thus, detecting
vulnerabilities often requires runtime testing.
The major challenge here is how to properly drive the vic-
tim subjects’ programs so we can observe all file usage, akin
to fuzz testing. Developing a fuzz testing approach for the file
system is outside the scope of this paper, so we simply drive
programs with available tools: (1) Android Exerciser Mon-
key; (2) Compatibility Testing Suite (CTS); and (3) Chizpurfle
[27]. We use the Android Exerciser Monkey and CTS to em-
ulate normal phone usage, and Chizpurfle to drive Android
system services. With the accurate attack surface identified
by PolyScope, we are able to find vulnerabilities described in
Section 7.6. We discuss how to employ runtime systematically
in the future in Section 8.1.
7 Evaluation
Table 2 summarizes the highlights of our evaluation for seven
fresh installs of OEM Android releases, demonstrating the
importance of computing per-victim adversaries, permission
expansion, and attack operations. Table 2 shows the relative
effort to vet Android releases for vulnerabilities using the
output of prior analyses [13, 24] (Authorized Data Flows),
output of a past analyses [29, 51] using PolyScope’s method
for computing adversaries (IVs for PolyScope Adversaries),
and two new analyses performed by PolyScope (PolyScope
IVs after Expansion and PolyScope IVs with Operations) that
provide a more accurate accounting of the threats victims may
face. The counts are shown in terms of subject-object pairs, as
subjects and objects are defined in Section 5.1. For data flows,
we sum of the objects that each subject is authorized to use
(i.e., in a read-like operation, see Section 2.2). For integrity
violations (IVs), we only count the data flows to objects that
another subject classified as an adversary is authorized to
modify (i.e., in a write-like operation, see Section 2.2).
The first row of Table 2 lists the number of authorized
data flows allowed by Android access control policies, show-
ing that analyses that only compute data flows [13, 24] leave
OEMs with hundreds of thousands of cases to assess to de-
tect vulnerabilities in Android releases. The second row in
Table 2 shows that the number of data flows to consider can
be reduced significantly by only considering those that cause
integrity violations. The particular way PolyScope computes
adversaries per-victim (see Section 5.2) for finding the IVs for
PolyScope adversaries results in a reduction of the number
of data flows involved in integrity violations by at least two
orders of magnitude.
Additionally, PolyScope provides two new analysis steps to
detect threats more accurately. First, the third row of Table 2
shows the number of PolyScope IVs after expansion, which
shows the counts for IVs found using the rules defined in
Section 5.4. In several cases, the number of integrity viola-
tions increases significantly after accounting for expansion, in
some cases by more than 10X. Second, the fourth row of Ta-
ble 2 shows that the number of PolyScope IVs with operations
based on the rules in Section 5.5 may be significantly reduced
(14-21% across these releases) because no attack operation
may be possible for some IVs given the filesystem and/or vic-
tim subjects’ program configurations. The average number of
attack operations possible for each integrity violation with at
least one attack operation is shown in the fifth row, indicating
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Table 2: Summary of Impact of PolyScope Analyses
Cross Version IVs (Google) Cross OEM IVs
Nexus 5x 7.0 Nexus 5x 8.0 Pixel3a 9.0 Mate9 8.0 Mate9 9.0 Mix2 9.0 Galaxy S8 9.0
Authorized Data Flows1 204,241 166,027 156,315 240,916 860,508 289,238 259,992
IVs for PolyScope Adversaries2 167 80 69 223 166 192 628
PolyScope IVs after Expansion3 372 478 1,139 1,682 1,566 2,304 4,377
PolyScope IVs with Operations4 297 387 927 1,331 1,327 1,979 3,736
Average Operations per IV5 1.18 1.10 1.04 1.62 1.37 1.08 1.36
Unit is the relation {Subject, Object}, where subjects and objects are defined in Section 5.1
1 Objects authorized for use by Subjects
2 Authorized Data Flows where Object is modifiable by at least one PolyScope per-victim adversary, see Section 5.2
3 PolyScope Integrity Violations (sum for all types) as defined in Section 5.4
4 PolyScope Integrity Violations in at least one Attack Operation, see Section 5.5
5 Sum of Attack Operations (in Table 4) per PolyScope IVs with Operation
the effort to test each release for vulnerabilities in terms of
the types of operations that must be tested.
In the remainder of the evaluation, we examine how the
PolyScope implementation (see Section 6) impacts the ana-
lysts’ efforts to vet their releases for vulnerabilities in Sec-
tions 7.1 to 7.4, we assess the distribution of IVs across priv-
ilege levels in Section 7.5, we describe how we found two
types of previously unknown vulnerabilities using PolyScope
output in Section 7.6, and we measure PolyScope’s analysis
performance in Section 7.7.
7.1 TE IV Computation
How many integrity violations are found when using the
SEAndroid MAC TE policy alone in TE IV Computation?
PolyScope’s implementation computes IVs initially using
only the SEAndroid MAC TE policy. Android has relied
heavily on MAC TE to protect important daemons and sys-
tem services since its introduction in Android 5.0, as shown
by the number of MAC TE allow rules5 in Table 3. Due to its
immutable nature, the MAC TE policy provides a foundation
for Android access control that other policies can modify.
The three TE rows (rows 2-4) of Table 3 show the num-
ber of binding-IVs, write-IVs, and read-IVs for the MAC TE
policy using the rules in Section 5.4. We note that in count-
ing the TE IVs we only use the MAC TE labels to identify
subjects and objects, which results in coarser-grained sub-
jects and objects than Section 5.1. Thus, the TE IV counts
presented represent a lower bound. We found this sufficient
for the qualitative comparison with IV counts after TE IV
validation below. The pathname-IV count is not shown as
no additional pathname-IVs are possible since there is no
permission expansion allowed for the MAC TE policy.
7.2 TE IV Validation
How are the number of integrity violations (IVs) reduced after
TE IV Validation from those found in the TE IV Computation?
The next four rows (rows 5-8) in Table 3 show the number
5The drastic increase of MAC allow rules can be largely attributed to the
effect of Google’s Project Treble [22] in Android 8, which introduced many
new MAC domains due to the decomposition of the Hardware Abstraction
Layer (HAL).
of IVs for the four IV types in Section 5.4 considering after
TE IV Validation (Valid) using other Android access control
policies6. We see that the number of TE IVs (rows 2-4) is
much greater than the number of valid IVs (rows 5-8), even
accounting for the coarser subjects and objects applied in the
TE IV counts7.
Recall in Table 2 that the total IV counts after permission
expansion are much higher across every release, showing that
more testing to detect vulnerabilities is required than just
testing IVs from the current policy. However, we observed
that the SEAndroid MLS policy does effectively prevent sev-
eral opportunities for victim permission expansion for ob-
jects in application-private directories (e.g., /data/data). If
MLS can be effectively applied to Android filesystems more
broadly that may greatly reduce the opportunities for victim
permission expansion.
7.3 IVs for OEM Customizations
How do OEM customizations impact the Android integrity vio-
lation counts across vendors? To make their products more at-
tractive, OEMs customize Android images to provide vendor-
specific, value-added functionality and more attractive user
interfaces. We are interested to see how OEM customization
affects the number of integrity violations created when the
OEMs have to customize their Android access control poli-
cies. The devices of choice are as follows: Huawei Mate9 on
Android O and Android P, Xiaomi Mix2 on Android O and
Android P, and Samsung Galaxy S8 on Android P. The results
are shown in the right half of Table 3.
We can see heavy customization of the MAC policy. Every
OEM has a significantly greater number of MAC allow rules
than the Google MAC policies in the left half of Table 3.
This suggests OEMs have introduced many new domains for
6Note that the total IV count shown in Table 2 for PolyScope IVs after
Expansion row are equal to the sum of All Read-IVs and All Pathname-IVs
rows in Table 3. The Write-IVs are a subset of the Read-IVs (i.e., all victims
have read access to IVs when they have write access) and the Binding-IVs
are a subset of the Pathname-IVs (i.e., victims can still access binding-IVs
through luring).
7In addition, 25% of TE IVs cannot be validated because the MAC-to-
DAC mapping for some subjects is not known, see Section 8.1. Although
this is a large number of TE IVs, the combination of policies still reduces the
Valid IV counts much more significantly.
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Table 3: Integrity Violations across Vendor Releases
Cross Version IVs (Google) Cross OEM IVs
Nexus 5x 7.0 Nexus 5x 8.0 Pixel3a 9.0 Mate9 8.0 Mate9 9.0 Mix2 8.01 Mix2 9.0 Galaxy S8 9.0
MAC TE allow rules2 64,830 133,545 191,556 250,220 276,181 273,295 282,650 498,941
TE Write-IVs4 468 411 1,130 2,067 1,958 1,657 2,197 1,787
TE Read-IVs4 1,410 2,373 4,296 8,922 9,890 8,370 8,423 10,912
TE Binding-IVs3 495 4,38 693 1,504 1,233 1,400 1,174 1,881
Valid Write-IVs4 120 19 56 400 236 232 216 469
Valid Read-IVs4 194 80 85 679 437 531 749 953
Valid Binding-IVs3 52 22 32 217 159 248 154 550
Valid Pathname-IVs4 178 398 1,054 1,003 1,129 1,186 1,555 3,424
TE implies only having permission in SEAndroid TE
1 This phone has significantly more files perhaps related to a higher number of pre-installed apps
2 Unit: number of rules
3 Unit: IVs (victim, object) for directory objects only
4 Unit: IVs (victim, object) for file objects only
their own services and apps, and granted them a wide variety
of MAC permissions. The result of this customization is a
significant increase MAC TE integrity violations, often more
than twice as many as the associated Google Android systems.
Even more importantly, the number of integrity violations is
significantly higher for the OEMs after TE IV validation (rows
5-8 in Table 3). For example, the number of binding-IVs in
Android version 9.0 systems is 32 for Google and at least 154
for the OEM Android 9.0 systems.
7.4 IVs to Attack Operations
How many attack operations are really possible for the IVs
found across OEM releases? Table 2 shows that not all the IVs
found after permission expansion enable adversaries to launch
attack operations because filesystem and/or victim subjects’
program configurations may prevent attack operations, as
described in Section 5.5.
Table 4 breaks down how many attack operations of each
type are possible given the configurations that may block such
operations. The number of file attack operations (adversary
writes) are roughly the same as the number of read integrity
violations (Valid Read-IVs), because not many objects asso-
ciated with integrity violations reside in read-only directories.
The number of file squat attack operations is the same as the
number of integrity violations for directories (Valid Binding-
IVs) in Table 3. However, the number of link traversal attack
operations that are possible is fewer than the number of in-
tegrity violations because not all filesystems support symbolic
links, reducing the number of directories where this attack
operation applies.
The luring traversal attack operations row identifies the
number of luring traversal attacks that could be performed via
Binder IPC, see Section 5.5. We can easily see that the number
of operations is a lot greater than the number of binding-IVs
alone (Valid Binding-IVs), since adversaries can expand the
victim’s permissions for pathname-IVs (Valid Pathname-
IVs). Recall that FileProvider usage is key to preventing lur-
ing traversal attacks (see the luring-traversal rule in Sec-
tion 5.5), where it has a non-trivial but modest impact on
reducing attack operations (14-21% across all releases). For
example, on Samsung Galaxy S8, we found that 57 out of 356
Java applications utilize FileProvider for file sharing, which
meant that 3,424 pathname-IVs were only reduced to 2,874
luring-traversal operations.
7.5 Cross-Privilege Level IVs
How are integrity violations distributed across Android privi-
lege levels? The IV distribution is important because it indi-
cates how victims at each privilege level could be attacked and
how adversaries at any privilege level could compose attacks
to reach other privilege levels. Table 5 shows the counts of file
and binding integrity violations between each pair of privilege
levels we evaluated. We do not include pathname-IVs in this
table to assess attack paths without luring.
Google’s 8.0 and 9.0 releases have a modest number
cross-privilege level IVs. This confirms our hypothesis that
Google’s access control policies are the closest to best prac-
tice. However, on the OEM side, it can be a completely dif-
ferent story. Other than the Mate9 9.0, the IVs between each
privilege level pair can be significant, meaning that even with-
out luring, releases may be vulnerable in a variety of ways.
7.6 Vulnerability Case Studies
What kind of vulnerabilities may be discovered from attack op-
erations? We found two previously unknown vulnerabilities
manually using the attack operations computed by PolyScope.
Samsung Resetreason: We also found a new binding vulner-
ability in the Samsung Galaxy S8 system using the Android
9.0 release. Samsung includes a privileged service called
resetreason that logs the reason why the phone has had to
reset into the file power_off_reset_reason.txt in the di-
rectory /data/log. However, any process that runs with the
AID_LOG group has write permission to that file, so such pro-
cesses can replace the file with a symbolic link to any file
accessible to resetreason to launch a link traversal attack.
While only signed apps may be granted the Android permis-
sion (READ_LOGS) associated with the AID_LOG DAC group,
vendors deploy several signed apps on their systems, and
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Table 4: Attack Operations
Nexus 5x 7.0 Nexus 5x 8.0 Pixel3a 9.0 Mate9 8.0 Mate9 9.0 Mix2 8.01 Mix2 9.0 Galaxy S8 9.0
File Attack2 176 70 79 597 358 478 655 862
Link Traversal Attack3 1 8 3 169 7 175 4 507
File Squat Attack3 52 22 32 660 443 248 154 847
Pathname Attack3 121 317 848 734 969 761 1,324 2,874
Unit: Sum of operations for all (victim, object) IVs
1 This phone has significantly more files perhaps related to a higher number of pre-installed apps
2 Only for file objects
3 Only for directory objects
Table 5: Cross-Privilege Level IVs
Nexus 5x 7.0 Nexus 5x 8.0 Pixel3a 9.0 Mate9 8.0 Mate9 9.0 Mix2 8.0* Mix2 9.0 Galaxy S8 9.0
T1∗ → T212 28 6 17 54 29 124 24 64
T1→ T3 40 22 21 17 12 40 25 22
T1→ T4 30 13 7 14 8 29 14 12
T1→ T5 24 9 6 16 8 23 8 12
T2→ T3 40 22 21 20 15 60 48 92
T2→ T4 30 13 7 14 8 78 72 199
T2→ T5 24 9 6 20 11 34 16 41
T3→ T4 31 24 16 265 129 85 87 124
T3→ T5 68 28 14 108 126 42 107 46
T4→ T5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
* T1(untrusted/isolated app), T2(priv/platform app) T3(services), T4(system app, system service), T5(root service)
1 For adversary at lower level (T1) and victim at higher level (T2)
2 Unit: Sum of binding and file IVs (no pathname-IVs included)
some signed apps have had reported vulnerabilities, such as
the adb app [3]. resetreason has access to several integrity-
critical resources, and we have confirmed that we can redirect
resetreason to write files in the encrypted filesystem direc-
tory. Previous work demonstrated the importance of attacks on
the encrypted filesystem from the system’s radio service [45].
This vulnerability has been confirmed by Samsung and as-
signed CVE ID CVE-2020-13833.
Xiaomi and Huawei Thememanager: We discovered mul-
tiple unreported vulnerabilities in the Xiaomi and Huawei
systems. We describe one example here. These systems in-
clude a variety of value-added services, where one is the
Thememanager, which allows users to customize the user in-
terface of their devices. However, the Xiaomi access control
policies are configured such that untrusted apps can write to
the file /data/data/com.android.thememanager/cache,
which is used by the Thememanager for storing content that
the Thememanager may use in configuring the display. We
verify on Xiaomi 8.0 that arbitrary modifications to this file
do crash the privileged Thememanager process and in some
cases impact the GUI without crashing the Thememanager. A
finely-crafted modification could perhaps exploit the Theme-
manager service. We found four other similar vulnerabilities
in the Xiaomi 8.0 release for writeable cache files.
We found that Huawei on both the 8.0 and 9.0 releases has
a similar vulnerability for the theme cache files as well, but
exploitation requires adversaries to compromise a privileged
application with media_rw permission. However, privileged
applications have been found to be flawed in several instances,
see Section 2.3.
Figure 4: PolyScope Performance
7.7 Performance
We measure the performance of PolyScope for the eight An-
droid releases. The overhead was measured on a PC running
an AMD Ryzen 7 3700X (8 core, 16 thread) with 16GB of
RAM and an RTX 2080 Super GPU using Ubuntu 18.04.
PolyScope IVs are found in two steps as described in Sec-
tion 6: TE IV computation and TE IV validation. We find
that the performance of TE IV computation has a linear rela-
tionship to the SEAndroid policy size. The TE IV validation
stage’s performance is proportional to the number of IVs
found in TE IV computation, but that impact can be reduced
because validation can be parallelized.
Figure 4 shows the performance overhead of these two
stages8 for the eight releases. We evaluate the performance of
8The cost of computing attack operations is negligible and included in
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the TE IV validation for one to eight threads. With a multi-
core CPU, parallelization does produce significant perfor-
mance improvement. We also point out that we found it quite
expensive to compute all the authorized data flows for these
releases. On the other hand, with a proper threat model to
prune cases, PolyScope is able to identify integrity violations
in a reasonable amount of time.
8 Discussion
In this section, we review limitations in the PolyScope ap-
proach and examine the implications of a recently proposed
Android defense called scoped storage.
8.1 Limitations
We identify three limitations of PolyScope: (1) PolyScope
relies on rooted phone to collect filesystem data; (2) we cannot
always determine the mapping between MAC labels and their
corresponding DAC UIDs; (3) PolyScope cannot confirm
vulnerabilities from attack operations automatically.
Without rooting the phone, we cannot gather DAC informa-
tion from privileged directories like /system. Recent research
developed a tool called BigMAC [24], which extracts accu-
rate DAC configuration data from these privileged directories
(9˜5%). We will include BigMAC into our data collection in
future iterations. Together with the data collected from an un-
rooted phone, see Appendix A.1, we should be able to recover
a nearly complete snapshot of the filesystem. We will explore
methods to achieve complete recovery in future work.
Another limitation of PolyScope is that finding the MAC-
to-DAC mapping of subjects requires running a process for
each MAC label to collect its DAC UIDs/groups9. Thus, it
is possible no process was launched for some MAC labels.
Currently, if either no adversary or victim for a computed
TE IV is mapped to a complete subject, we skipped the IV
validation stage for that TE IV. Currently, about 25% of the
TE IVs do not go through validation. Runtime support could
detect when a process is run for an unmapped MAC label to
collect the mapping.
Finally, PolyScope lacks a systematic way to test the vic-
tims for vulnerabilities to the attack operations found. The
problem is that we need to know when a victim uses a file,
binding, or IPC that is associated with an attack operation.
A passive runtime tool [52] was developed to monitor pro-
cesses for use of bindings associated with attack operations
(i.e., file squatting and link traversal). However, this tool only
used the available DAC policies to determine whether an at-
tack operation would be possible, and did not test for other
attack operations. PolyScope’s more accurate computation of
attack operations should improve the effectiveness of such
an approach. To test for luring traversals, one must develop
methods to detect at-risk IPCs rather than file accesses. The
the TE IV validation.
9Recall that we leverage the finding of Chen et al. [13] that the MAC-to-
DAC mapping for Android systems is one-to-one.
Jigsaw system [50] provides a method for identifying system
calls that may receive input that could enable luring traversals,
but it does not identify the scope of targets to which luring
may occur. PolyScope identifies a full scope of luring targets
using victim permission expansion, so we will explore the
use of PolyScope to generate test cases for the system calls
identified by Jigsaw.
8.2 Scoped Storage
Polyscope identifies several integrity violations located in
external storage, so we discuss the potential impact on
PolyScope of a defense introduced in Android 10 that of-
fers some protections for external storage, called scoped stor-
age [21]. Scoped storage aims to remove two coarse-grained
and problematic Android Permissions that grant applications
read/write permissions to external storage. Under fully en-
forced scoped storage, applications can only access their
private folder in external storage, and file sharing should
only be performed with designated file sharing APIs like
FileProvider. However, to support application functional-
ity and ease the transition, Android 10 does not fully enforce
scoped storage. Applications can still store files in shared
external storage locations and have the option to opt-out of
scoped storage by requesting for legacy storage in the mani-
fest file. Therefore, IVs identified by Polyscope are still poten-
tial targets in Android 10. For the upcoming Android 11, cur-
rent documentation suggests that scoped storage will be fully
enforced, but a functionality named All File Access [20] can
still grant applications read-write permission to files stored
on external storage. This could potentially open up new at-
tack surfaces and once the technical details of scoped storage
are finalized for Android 11, we will include the changes in
PolyScope. Finally, we note that scoped storage has no impact
on IVs outside of external storage, including the vulnerable
IVs identified in Section 7.6.
9 Related Work
Researchers have long known about the three types of in-
tegrity violations listed in Section 4, but have found it difficult
to prevent programs from falling victim to such threats. A
variety of mechanisms have been proposed to prevent attacks
during name resolution, including defenses for binding and
pathname vulnerabilities. These defenses have often been fo-
cused on TOCTTOU attacks [8,34]. Some defenses are imple-
mented in the program or as library extensions [15,16,37,47]
and some as kernel extensions [12, 36, 38, 44, 48, 49], but
the methods overlap, where some enforce invariants on file
access [15, 37, 38, 44, 48, 49], some enforce namespace invari-
ants [12,36], and some aim for “safe” access methods [16,47].
In general, all program defenses have been limited because
they lack insight into the changing system and all system
defenses are limited because they lack side-information about
the intent of the program [11].
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The main defense for preventing filesystem vulnerabilities
is access control. If the access control policies prevent an
adversary from accessing the filesystem resources that enable
attack operations, then the system is free of associated vul-
nerabilities. However, the discretionary access control (DAC)
policies commonly used do not enable prediction of whether
a subject may obtain an unauthorized permission [26], so
techniques to restrict DAC [30, 40, 46] and apply mandatory
access control (MAC) enforcement [6, 7] were then explored,
culminating in the adoption of MAC enforcement in some
systems, such as Linux Security Modules [56] employed in
SELinux [1] and AppArmor [35]. Researchers than proposed
MAC enforcement for Android systems [10,57], but a version
of SELinux [1] targeting Android was developed, called SE-
Android [42] was adopted. However, the attack operations we
find in this paper abuse available MAC permissions. While
a techniques have been developed to limit processes to their
full permissions on individual system calls [41, 53], such
techniques need policy analysis to determine the policies to
enforce.
Researchers have proposed using access control policy anal-
ysis to identify misconfigurations that may lead to vulnerabil-
ities [2, 28], but traditionally, access control policy analysis
methods only reason about one policy, such as a mandatory
access control (MAC) policy [2,14,29,51] or an Android per-
mission policy [17, 54, 55]. However, based on the research
challenges above, we must consider the combination of the
access control policies employed on the system to compute
attack operations accurately. Chen et al. [13] were the first
work that we are aware of to combine MAC and DAC policies
in access control policy analysis. Hernandez et al. [24] fur-
ther extended their analysis to include MAC, DAC and Linux
capabilities. However, both of these techniques compute data
flows, which are much more numerous than integrity viola-
tions. Chen et al. look for data flows that may lead to sensitive
data leakage directly rather than attack operations that may
enable such leakage as PolyScope does.
10 Conclusions
Android uses a combination of filesystem access control mech-
anisms to assure its platform integrity. This paper has pro-
posed PolyScope, a policy analysis tool that reasons over
Android’s mandatory (SEAndroid) and discretionary (UNIX
permissions) access control policies, in addition to the other
mechanisms (e.g., Android permissions) that influence file
access control. PolyScope is novel in its ability to reason
about permission expansion, which lies at the intersection of
mandatory and discretionary policy. We applied PolyScope
to three different Google Android releases and five different
OEM Android releases, characterizing the potential for file-
based attacks such as file squatting, link traversal, and luring
traversal. In doing so, we identified two new vulnerabilities
in OEM Android releases and opportunities to direct further
automated testing. Our results suggest that the access con-
trol policy changes introduced by OEMs do not sufficiently
address integrity violations for their feature additions.
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A Additional Background
In this section, we provide details on how PolyScope collects
the relevant access control information.
A.1 Access Control Data Collection
MAC Data: To obtain MAC data, PolyScope first pulls
the SEAndroid policy binary file from the Android root
directory with command "adb pull sepolicy". With the
SELinux policy binary in hand, we extract the allow rules
with "sesearch -A sepolicy". Then, in order to parse
the SELinux attributes, we pull the attribute mapping with
"seinfo -a -x sepolicy".
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DAC Data: To obtain DAC permissions for all files on an
Android system, PolyScope executes "adb shell ls -lRZ"
from the root directory. Note that the phone must be rooted to
obtain the full list of file permissions, so we use a boot time
root technique to gain root. PolyScope collects the file permis-
sion data shown in Table 6. The data in Table 6 indicates: a
file authtokcont under the directory /efs has read, write
permissions for its owner and group members. Its owner and
group UID are both radio, and its MAC security label is
efs_file.
Table 6: File DAC data sample
File DAC perms User Group MAC security label
authtokcont -rw-rw-r-- radio radio efs_file
Process Information: PolyScope obtains process access con-
trol information by executing the command "adb shell
ps -A -o label,user,group,COMMAND", which provides
a mapping from a DAC user ID to MAC label for running
processes. One data sample is shown in Table 7. This entry
shows that process init has security label of u:r:init:s0,
UID of root, GID of root, was spawned by command /init,
and PID of 1. However, the process list collection does not
provide the full information on DAC supplementary groups,
as we described in Section 5.3. In the case of Android system
services, these extra groups are defined in the init.rc file,
which can be parsed statically. For apps, PolyScope uses a
shell script to obtain process DAC group information stored
in /proc.
Table 7: Process Data
Security label UID Group Command PID
u:r:init:s0 root root /init 1
Android Permission Data: To obtain Android Per-
missions’ mappings to DAC groups, PolyScope parses
/etc/platform.xml from the Android device. Next, we
need to separate the signature Android Permissions from the
non-signature Android Permissions, which are available via
the Android package manager (PM), as the non-signature
permissions may be applied by an app. PolyScope uses the
non-signature permissions to compute DAC expansion for
adversaries.
Filesystem and FileProvider: To determine whether attack
operations are blocked, PolyScope needs to examine the
filesystem configuration and the application package. First,
PolyScope obtains filesystem configurations by running "adb
shell mount", which will return list of filesystem mount
configuration. We identify the directories mounted with the
ro or the nosymlink flags and mark them as read-only and
prohibiting symlinks, respectively. Second, for the applica-
tion package, we want to determine if the application uses the
FileProvider class to protect itself from luring. PolyScope first
queries the PackageManager service for a full list of apk files
on the system. Next, PolyScope collects all the apk files found
and performs code inspection with Google’s new ClassyShark
tool [18] to identify the presence of the FileProvider class.
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